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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENN~CO'l"I' COPPIDR CORPO-
RA'l'ION, and 
BINGHAM AND GAHFH~LD 
H.AILWAY CCnlPANY, 
r> 1('1·J·1 I .;ft.~ 
_.1. .''. < [1 •• ' 
-vs.-
THJi~ STA'J'Ji~ TAX CO:\l ;\li8H10N, 
Defr.ndanf. 
Case No. 
7298 
Plaintiffs respt>dfnlly rPquest a n~!Jearing- of the 
above cause on the following grounds: 
1. This Court's conclusion that depletion may be 
computed only on that part of Kennecott's net income 
from the property allocated to Utah can find support in 
neither fac't nor law and contravenes the express man-
date of the legislature to the contrary by Chapter 13, 
Title 80, Utah Code Annotated 1943, especially its Sec-
tions 80-13-8 (9) (b) and 80-13-21. 
1 
2. This Court has violated basic and elementary 
principles of statutory construction by concluding that 
depletion may be computed only on that part of Ken-
necott's net income from the property a:;:signed to Utah. 
:1. The Court erred in its decision relative to the 
depletion deduction 'Wherein it held that Kennecott's 
request to change ,the method of computation was "un-
duly delayed," a hoMing contrary to fact and not raised 
by the Commission. 
4. The Court erred m holding that Kennecott's 
request for permission to change the method of depletion 
eomputation was for no" substantial" n~ason, but merely 
to "escape tax liability." 
5. The court erred in holding that the record in 
this case supported the rrax Commission 'R decision, re-
jecting Kennecott's corporate tax return and instead re-
quiring continued use of its Utah Copper Division opera-
tions as the basis for tax computation. 
C. C. PARSONS, 
WM. M. McCREA, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
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BRIEF 
I. 
Point 
This Court's conclusion that depletion may be computed 
only on that part of Kennecott's net income from the 
property allocated to Utah can find support in neither f~ct 
nor law and contravenes the express T1.::rr'.dat~~ of the Le~is· 
lature to the contrary by Chapter 13, T:i.tle 80, Utah Co(:e 
Annotated 1943, especially its Sections 80-13-8 (9) (b) ~.nd 
80-13-21. 
No income at all is derived ftoJ11 this property until 
the marketable product is sold. Smelting and refining 
and transportation from smelter to refineries are ac-
tivities, not of Kennecott, but of others hired by Kenne-
cott for that purpose~ Like all other activities in this 
single continuous ann elosel? integrated mining opera-
tion tl1eir ccst was paid by Kennecott, and with the 
Commission's approval was deducted from the gross 
income of Kennecott's Utah Copper Division whereby 
to arrive at that Division's taxable net income. The cost 
of those services included profit earned by and taxes 
levied upon the independent custom smelters and re-
fineries and the transcontinental carriers. Of course 
those services added to the value of the ultima·te product 
(without them there would have been no ultimate 
product, no operation, and nothing for Utah to tax). 
Wherein these and all others essential to this operation 
contributed to the creation of a commercially marketable 
product, Utah benefited by the increased net income 
from the property which Utah was able to subje0t to its 
State franchise tax. 
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This operation began with the removal of the crude 
ores from the ground in Bingham Canyon, Utah, and 
was not concluded until the production of the first com-
mereially marketable product in the metals refined and 
sold on the },tlantic coast; hence the allocation fraction. 
Section 80-13-21. None of these aetivities in and of itself 
yielded a profit. The only profit to taxpayer was tluJt 
realized when the refined metals were sold. The metals 
sold were from the property (certainly they were from 
nowhere else) and their cash equivalent for which they 
were sold was income from the same Ronrce. In the 
nature of things there neither waR nor could there have 
been any other source ·than the mining- property in Utah. 
1\f either fabrication of the refined metalR nor their 
uses for any purpose are here involved. The minim~ op-
eration ceased Y.rith the production of the refined metals 
and their sale. "\Ve are not here concerned with income 
derived from fabrication or from any other operation 
subsequent to that of mining, with which and only with 
which we are here concerned. This Court correctly 
defined the term "mining" as follows: 
"Generally speaking, the phrase 'income 
from the property' means the income from min-
ing. 'The latter term is usually understood to 
mean not merely the extraction of ores or miner-
als from the ground, but also the ordinary treat-
ment processes normally applied by operators in 
order to obtain the commercially marketable min-
eral product. '' 
The several processes described in this Court's opmwn 
were but incidents of this single, uninterrupted, closely 
integrated mining 'operation. Without each and all of 
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them in their integrated aggregate, there would be no 
income to tax. Of those operations some were within the 
State of Utah, others outside, and the statutory alloca-
tion formula is for the purpose of assigning to the State 
of Utah an equitable part of the total net income from 
this mining property by this mining operation in its 
entirety, on the basis of business done wi,~hin the State 
of Utah as compared with that transacted outside. 
Depletion must he computed on the ne•t income from 
the property, hut when the Court states that Kennecott's 
mining operation invv.ctcc; "fielcts not usually associated 
with e::.!. ... ·on .,,,r\ ;,n 1c• ci' nt·c;;." it incli::att;s a lack of 
understanding of the facts, which app~rcntly precludes 
correct decision. Kennecott's operation is not only that 
"usually associated with extraction and sale of ores;" 
its field is that of all the great copper producers, from 
the operations of which more than ninety percent of the 
world's co;}per is obtained. The world is dependent 
upon the low grade copper ores for its supply of copper 
and of practical necessity, if mined at all, these low 
grade ores must be removed from the ground on magni-
ficent scale and handled in enormous quantity to produce 
copper as the uHimate marketable product; otherwise the 
operation would not be profitable.* The product at any 
point prior to the refined metals of necef!sity must be on 
"' 
Anaconda Copper Company 
Anaconda Copper Company mills, smelts and refines all 
of its production in Montana. Sales are by Anaconda 
Sales Company, located in New York. 
Kennecott Copper Corporation 
Kennecott Copper Corporation mills all of its production 
6 
a scale beyond the financial ability of any smeHer to pur-
chase and carry over the ninety day period required for 
the smelting, transportation and refinement before a 
commercially marketable product could be obtained. 
It may he that this Court is laboring under the de-
lusion that the franchise tax sbtute was enacted with 
the basic thought that all "normal" mining operators 
sold their crude ores or concentrates to the various 
custom snelters within the State of Utah, at which point 
their mininp; operations cease•l and that therefore Ken-
neeott's operation was not rnntc•mpl·cte(l by the Legis-
1atu re. 
The franchi:-:;e tax statute was enacterl m 1931, at 
and does ito, own smelting at the Nevada and Chin,, D-i-
visions, where the mines of those Divisions, respectively, 
are sitm.ted. At the Ray Division the smelting is done 
in Arizona by the American Smelting and Refining Com-
pany under contract. At the Utah Division smelting is 
done in Utah by the American Smelting and Refining 
Company under contract. A small part1 of Chino produc-
tion is fire-refined in New Mexico, 1but all the rest of 
Kennecott's pmduction from all its Western properties 
has been electrically refined under contmct by the Ameri-
can Smelting and Refining Ccmpany in states other than 
those wherein the ores are extracted. All sales are by 
Kennecott Sales Corporation in New York. 
Phelps-Dodge Corporation 
Phelps-Dodge Corporation mills, smelil:s and sells all its 
copper production, the smelting generally being done in 
Arizona, New Mexico and Mexico, the states where the 
mines are located; but the refining is done on c-ontract 
by Phelps-Dodge Refining Corporation at El P.aSio, Texas 
and Laurel Hill, New York. Sales are by Phelphs-Dodge 
Corporation with offices in New Y1ork. 
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which time the Utah Copper mine had been in operation 
a full quarter of a century. The nature of that operation 
in and out of the Sta:te of Utah over the whole of that 
quarter century was accurately and fully comprehended 
by the taxing authorities and the successive Legislatures 
of this Sta,te. rrhe Legislature of 1931 enacted the fran-
chise tax statute with its mine depletion deduction pro-
visiom~ knovYinz full well tho oreration of Utah Copper 
Cornpnny in and out of the State of Utah, the profitahle 
chanwter of that oper·t:tion and the revenue lobe derived 
by the State of Utah by applying thereto ,this franchise 
tax statute with its al]oca,tion formula devised to meet 
this Company's mining activities, initiated in the State 
Inspiration Consolidated Copper Company 
In the past the proclucciun from Ins;)iration Consolidated 
Copper Company has been in part from leaching cpera-
tio'!S, ai'd ~hat part is refined at the mine. The other por-
tion of the production comes from concentrating ores. 
These are ,smelted on contract by the International Smelt-
ing & Refining Company at Miami, Arizona, where the 
mine is located, and 'On this part the refining is done by 
International Smelting & Refining Company's refining 
works in New Jersey. All of the sales are by Anaconda 
Sales Company, located in New York. 
Castle Dome 
This company is a subsidiary .of Miami Copper Company. 
The ores are milled 1at the mine near Miami, Arizona, 
smelted on contraot at International Smelting & Refining 
Company's smelter at Miami in part and part on contract 
by Phelps-Dodge at Douglas, Arizlona. That part which 
is smelted by InternaJtioJ11al is refined by the International 
Smelting Company in the State of New Jersey, and that 
part which is smelted by Phelps-Dodge is refined by 
Phelps-Dodge Refining Corporation at El Paso, Texas. 
Sales are by Adolph Lewisohn & Sons, located at New 
York. 
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of Utah, but concluded only on the Atlantic coast. In itt: 
calculation of anticipated State revenue the Legislature 
did not ov,~;:·look this, the greatest open pit copper mine 
in the worM and the State's largest taxpayer. 
Kennf\cott and its predecessor Utah Copper Com-
pany, with the other mining interests affected, were con-
sulted and participated in the framing, amendment or 
interpretation not only of the State franchise tax act, 
but of the occupa.tion tax, net proceeds act, and other 
statutes from time ·to time introduced for the purpose of 
taxing the Inining industry. Also Kennecott and its 
predecessor Utah Copper Company had been on the 
tlefensive hefore the t:ning m'tho6ties of the State of 
Utah an<1 the courts on review of the conduct of those 
authorities too frequently to permit the conclusion that 
the character of their operation tax-wise had escaped 
the Legislature's notice. A mining operation is entered 
upon to obtain a commercially marketable mineral prod-
Miami Copper Company 
The ores are milled at the mine at Miami, Arizon:1, smelted 
on contract at International Smelting & Refining Com-
pany's smelter, also at Miami, in part, and part by the 
Phelps-Dodge at Doug-las, Arizona. That part which is 
smelt~cl by International is refined hy the International 
Smelting Company at its refinery in New Jersey, and that 
part which is smelted by Phelps-D~1dge is refined by 
Phelps-Dodge Rdining Corporat·ion at El Paso, Texas. 
Sales ue by Adolph Lewisohn & Sons, located at New 
York. 
Consolidated Copper Mines 
Ore is milled and smelted on contract in N evacla in which 
state the mine is located, refined by American Metal Com-
pany at New Jersey, and sold by Consolidated Copper 
Mines Company in New York. 
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uct. In this instance, for reasons well understood, such 
a product could not have been obtained within the State 
of Utah; of practical necessity it was obtainable and 
obtained only at the conclusion of the operation on the 
Atlantic coast, where and only where the entire net in-
come from the property was or could have been realized . 
.Moreover we have shown that there is nothing 
unique or unn:mal in this mining operation of Kennecott 
and ih; predecessor Utah Copper Company, having in 
mind both its in-and-out-of-the-State-of-Utah aspect and 
the copper product which it mines. 
The Court proceeds: 
'' • • • We believe that if the taxpayer claims 
that all net income is not earned in this state, that 
Magma Cc pl)er Company~Arizona 
Ore io; lllilled and smelted by Magma Copper Company 
in Ari:'.ona, refined ·on contract by Phelps-Dodge Refining 
Corporation either at El Paso, Texas, or Long Island, 
New York, and sold by the Magma Copper Sales Corpo-
ration located in New Y1ork 
Calument & Hecla Consolidated Copper Company 
The production from this company is smelted and refined 
by this company in Michigan and is sold by the same 
company in New York. 
In 1941 the above accounted for 89o/o of the copper pro-
duced in the United States. The same pfiOceclures have been 
followed since that time, but the relative production from these 
properties has increased. All of the above information is from 
American Bureau 'of Metal Statistics, a bureau which up until 
the time of the war furnished the authoritative data on copper 
pvoduced in the United States, and from the Minerals Year 
Book, which is published by the Bureau of Mines, a depart-
ment of the United States DepartmentJ of the Interior. 
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the J;ortion alloeated to business done out-
side this state must, of necessity, not be, income 
from the property within the meaning of Ol~r 
statute. • " " if any net income is attributable to 
business done elsewhere, it must come from opera-
tions which would not be considered ordinary 
treatment processes normally applied by opera-
tors. The taxpayer in thi~ instnneo is in a rather 
inconsistent posi,tion to assert that net income 
pertaining to business perfonned outRide this 
state can he considered aR net income from the 
property. " " • All we need do in this case is to 
point out ,that there are two noRsihle p~cths for the 
taxpayer to take. " ·~ " f<jithe1· tl1e net income is 
from the property and should lJe allorated to this 
state, or the net incom:- is from hnth thp pronerty 
and the postmininp; artivities and they are not so 
related that the net in('ome f'annot he roughly 
alloca:ted ,to both sources. " • "'' 
In the light of the fncts to which the Court's atten-
tion has now been directed, we think it will be understood 
that the foregoing excerpt from the Court's opinion is 
utterly unintelligible to us. H appears to us as a com-
plete non sequitur. 
The statute provides that: 
''The portion of net income assignable to 
business done within this state, and which shall 
be the basis and a measure of the tax imposed 
by this chapter, may be determined by an alloca-
tion upon the basis of the following rules: • • •" 
§ 80-13-21. 
How could it be that "if the taxpayer claims that all 
net income is not earned in this State, that the portion 
allocated to business done outside this State must, of 
10 
necessity, not be income from the property within the 
meaning of our statute"~ Upon what premise are we 
expected to arrive at that astonishing conclusion~ The 
Court had already correctly defined the operation in and 
out of the State of Utah as a single, uninterrupted min-
ing operation. Indeed it is here so stipulated. Surely it 
must be presumed to remain such until some interrup-
tron shall have occurred more potent than the mere In-
tervention of a State line. 
Vvhy are we to conclude that the refined metals are 
not "from the property" merely because State lines 
intel'venc in the processes necessary to the realization of 
that first and the ultimate co1mnercially marketable min-
eral product sought? Of conrse, this Court would not 
deny that the refined metals were from the property. 
rrhose refined metals were income's equivalent; where-
fore, would it not be reasonable to conclude that their 
money equivalent was income likewise from the prop-
erty~ By what inexplicable magic doe<s the intervention 
of a State line break the continuity of this single, un-
interrupted, closely integrated mining operation and 
render no longe1· "from the property" the refined metals 
mined from that source; or render their money equiva-
lent, income no longer likewise from that property7 
\Vhat the intervention of State lines t:ould have to do 
with what was or was not income from the property 
we cannot comprehend. Were this mining operation in 
its integrated entirety ,to and including its first com-
mercially marketable mineral product wholly within the 
State of Utah, would this Court deduct from its total 
net ineome, an estimated net income from transportation, 
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refining and sales, and compute depletion only upon what 
was left~ Of course it would not! Then why here emas-
culate that deduction for no other or better reason than 
that transportation, some smelting, and all refining and 
sa1eR were accomplished beyond the Utah State line? 
The Court continues: 
"If any net income is attributable to busi-
ness done elsewhere, it must come from opera-
tions which would not be considered ordinary 
treatment processes normally applied by opera-
tors.'' 
'l'o that statement the Cour·t aR fiCCn has nlrearl.y apnlied 
its own (1enial. '!'hat statc·ment is a aen1al of the very 
fact the Cour·t itself correctly has declD red, since the 
operations here involved, and aU of them, were ia fact 
the "ordinary treatment processes normally applied by 
operators in order to obtain the commercially marketable 
mineral product.'' Wherein were they not such~ Do they 
cease to be such when State lines intervene, and if so, 
why? 
\:Vhy should the taxpayer ·be in this instance ''in a 
rather inconsistent position to assert that net income 
pertaining to business performed outside ·this state can 
be considered as net income from the pro'P'erty'' ~ The 
taxpayer has followed the plain and unequivocal word-
ing of the statute, which sets up the ratio of business 
done in the State to that transacted outside, as a basis 
for allocation in and out of the State of the total net 
income, including rentals, dividends and other income 
as well as that derived from the property by the min-
12 
ing operation the Court has defined. None of these 
operations are post-mining. They are, as the Court 
properly defined them, a part of mining itself. Fabrica-
tion of the refined metals would be a post-mining ac-
tivity, but fabrication 1s not here involved. Mining ceased 
with the production and sale of the first and ultimate 
commercially marketable mineral product, i.e., the re-
fined metals. Such is the Court's own definition. 
Then the Court further proceeded: 
"All we need do in this case is to point ont 
that there are two possible •paths for the taxpayer 
to take ~, * '" Either the net income is from the 
property and should be allocated to this state, or 
the net income is from both the property and the 
postmining activities and they are not so related 
that the net income cannot be roughly allocated 
to both sources.'' 
vVhy ma;· these plaintiffs not adhere to ithe position 
which alwars has been theirs, that here they must com-
ply with the statute which provides that: 
''The portion of net income assignable to 
business dJone within this state, and which shall 
be the basis and measure of the tax imposed by 
this chapter, may be determined by an allocation 
upon the ba::;is of the following rules:" (~80-13-
21). 
We suggest that the Court also remember that it is 
here called upon to construe that same statute in the 
light of the stipulated facts. 
There being no market for Kennecott's ores, for 
its concentrates or for its blister copper with milling, 
13 
';melting, refining and transportation being nothing more 
than certain of the many necessary steps contributing 
to the first and ultimate commercially marketable prod-
net at the conclusion of the mining operation, the Corn-
mission in its computations always started, as of course 
it nmst, with that first and ul1irnate commercinl prodnet, 
whether for mine depletion, net proeee(h; or the occupa-
tion tax. Any attf•mpted allocation of income to an)' 
of these preliminary activities, each and all of which 
are necessary to a commercial product anti net income, 
is eertninly not within the contemplation of the statute, 
no more than does the statute contemplate a further 
breakdown of net income as for labor, supplies or pay-
ment of Rocial Security taxes. 'ro what fantastic result 
is this Court's legislative effort to bring us. The Court 
is not construing the statute--there is none such. 
There is nothing in this statute which seeks first to 
break down a single, continuous, integrated mining oper-
ation into its several processes up to and including the 
'p'roduetion and sale of the ultimate commercially market-
able product; then to locate ~the intervening state lines; 
and finally on the basis of their occurrence to eliminate 
from the total ''net income from the property'' for pur-
poses of depletion calculation, such excluded parts as in 
the sovereign discretion of this defendant may accord 
with its conception of what is equitable to Utah. 
Seetion 80-13-8 (9) (b) provides: 
''The allowance for depletion shall be thirty-
three and one-third per cent of the ne:t income 
from tl1e property." 
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·while the entire net income from Kennecott's Utah 
Copper Division (except of course for minor rentals 
and dividends a}ways excluded) is from its property in 
Utah, that net income is in large part the result of busi-
ness transacted outside the State of Utah. rrherefore, 
Section 80-13-21, the statutory allocation formula, con-
templates the very situation here involved and makes 
provision for just that allocation returned by the plain-
tiffs. 
This Court concludes that since the only property 
subject to depletion is located in Utah, the depletion al-
towance should be computed on the net income allocated 
to Utah. The defendant wants the money; but why the 
Court so concludes is not disclosed. It is respectfully 
submitted that the defendant and this Court attempt 
to rewrite the statute. 
Depletion is defined as a reduction in values by 
destroying or consuming resources or values. Deprecia-
tion comprehends something which may be replaced, 
but that which is lost through depletion is gone forever. 
If assets are held for the purpose of earning revenue, 
it is clea'r that any shrinkage in their value is a loss, 
which should be charged against income before true 
profit or net income can be ascertained. It is the unvary-
ing practice, in the valuation of mining pro'perty, to 
find the value of the minerals in the ground on the basis 
of their sales price, the quantity of such minerals and 
the deductions comprehending the total cost of operation, 
including of .course the mining of the crude ores, milling, 
smelting, refining·, transportation, marketing and all 
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other activities and processes essential to the ultimate 
objective of a commercially marketable production. This 
has always lx~en and can be the only basis upon which 
the n1lue of mining 'Property may be determined. As the 
mining propr•rty is the thing depleted, the basis for deple-
tion must he the value of the property, determined as 
stated. Such being the only accepted concept of depletion, 
it is fallacious and unprecedented to assign any profit or 
net income to any intermediate process or activit~', and 
no sucl1 attempt would be made by any qualified ap-
praiser. \~Vere the Utah Copper mine to he evaluated for 
purpose of sale, such woulcl he the only basis which could 
be used in arriving at the profit or loss sustained under 
the franrhise tax statute. What is here actually going on 
is that the ore body of the Utah Copper mine is being 
sold from year to year, and the value of the part sold is 
~the profit or net income resulting from the year's opera-
tion to and inelndinr; tl1e fir:-;t eommercially marketable 
product and its sale. The resulting shrinkage in the 
value of the ore body is de'pletion, which must he com-
puted on the basis of ~total value and must first be de-
ducted before net income can be realized. 
In the li~~ht of the foregoing facts how can this 
Court, without any precedent or authority whatever, in 
the teeth of a statute which does not so provide, solemnly 
declare its opinion that for purposes of the depletion 
calculation, those activities or processes performed be-
yond the State line, although without question all neces-
sary to the first marketable product resulting from the 
total integrated operation, necessary to the very income 
taxed, must have allocated to them either by some in-
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e~,l1licnl)k' inennin.tion, or hy an m·hitrary stat('-line 
division, a part of that total net income in computing 
the allowance for depletion! It is res'P'ectfully submitted 
that it is the plain intent of the law that the taxpayer 
shall have the value of his mining property as of the 
basic date, income tax free. Actually no mining operator 
realizes a profit or any net income until the operation 
shall have discharged its ·burden of returning to the 
participants in the venture the capital invested. 'rhe 
Utah Si:ate l<'ranchise Tax Act did not become effecti\'e 
until .January 1, 1931, and any appreciation in the value 
of tlw E1inernl (l;':;o:·.it 1wfore tkct date ennno~ be su1Jject 
to tax as income. The plain intent of legis·lative enact-
ments, whether Federal or State, is that there shall be 
allowed compensations for Joss through exhaustion of the 
mineral property, and the amount of depletion allowable 
will obviously he 'prnporJionD.te to the exhaustion suf-
fered. De~Ietion suffered in any year is the money value 
in the ground of that part of the ore body removed by 
production; and its money value in the ground is its 
sales price, less all costs up to the first commercially 
mnrketahle produd, such marking the termination of the 
mining operation. 
The Legislature recognized the faet that the mine 
at Bingham is a wasting asset and deen'ed that the 
depletion allowance should he computed on the "net 
income from the prope1'ty." Thus using Kennecott's 
1ire.t mar\zetable product as the base, was this statute 
construed and applied by the defendant from its passage 
until March 10, 1945, the date of defendant's proposed 
adjustments. 'J.1he allowance for depletion is not part 
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of the allocation formula-it is a deduction just as are 
the costs of the mining operation, a deduction which by 
Seetion 80-13-21 is to be made before an allocation frac-
tion can be applied. It is not intended to make, and the 
statute cannot be rightly construed as making, the de-
pletion allowance dependent on or subject to an aUoea-
tion of net income to tne State of Utah. The propriety 
of a depletion allowance is not to be ruled hy the fortu-
itous occurrence of state boundaries. The one bears no 
relation to the other. By the statute itself the deple-
tion deduction must be mo.de nn0n total. net income 
befoce depletion, not npnn a par< of it, and the depletion 
deduction must of necessit:v nroc:ede allocation of net 
income b• Utah. 
In the absence of other authority, the intent of the 
Legislature eX"pressed in the Utah Net Proceeds Tax 
Statute, Section 80-5-56, Utah Code Annotated 194;), as 
amended, Session Laws 1947, c. 106, Section 1, page 398, 
and the Utah Mine Occupation rrax Statute, Section 80-
5-66, as amended, should be especially significant. 
By Sections 80-5-56, 57, of the Net Proceeds Tax 
Statute, as amended, it is provided that: 
'' 80-5-56. Asse~sment of ]\fines. 
''All metalliferous mines and mining C'laims, 
both placer and rock in place, shall he assessed 
• * * at a value equal to 'two times the average 
net annual proceeds thereof for the three calendar 
years next preceding or for as many years or 
fractions thereof next preceding as the mine has 
been operating, whichever is less.* * * 
"80-5-57. Id. Net Annual Proceeds-Definition 
of-Basis for Tax-Deductions. 
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"The words, 'net annual proceeds,' of a 
metalliferous mine m mining claim are defined 
to he the gross proceeds realized. during the pre-
ceding calendar year from the sale or conversion 
into money or its equivalent of all ores from such 
mine or mining claim * • *The foUowing, and no 
other, deductions may be taken: 
"(5) The actual cost not exceeding a reason-
able cost of ·the transportation of the ore from 
the mine to the market or reduction works. 
" ( 6) The charge made for sampling, assay-
ing, rcducting (sic) and smelting the ore and 
extracting the metals and minerals therefrom; 
* * * '' 
By Section 80-fJ-66, as amended, of the Mine Occupa-
tion Ta.x Statute, it is provided that: 
'' • • • every person engaged in the business 
of mining or producing ore containing gold, 
silver, copper, ·lead, iron, zinc or other valuable 
metal in this state shall pay to the state of Utah 
an occupation tax equal to one per cent of the 
gross amount received for or the gross value of 
metalliferous ore sold • • * 
'' (c) If a mill or other reduction works is 
opera ted exclusively in connection with a mine, 
such mill or reduction works shall be treated as 
a part of the mine and the cost of operating such 
mill or reduction works shall, for the purpose 
of fixing the occupation tax imposed by this act, 
be regarded as part of the cost of mining and cost 
of assaying, sampling, smelting, refining, and 
transportation, only, shall he deducted..'' 
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The net proceeds tax is an ad valorem property 
tax levied upon mines and mining claims evaluated by 
applying a multiple to the average net proceeds from 
the propei'ty over a. period of years preceding the tax. 
Under that statute the miner must report his total net 
proceeds from the property after deductions for "mill-
ing, smelting, refining, marketing, transporting,'' etc. 
No court or commission has yet attempted to break down 
such net proceeds at points where state boundaries 
may intercept the path of "the ordinary treatment 
processes normally applied by operators in order to oh-
tain th~ commercially marketable mineral product," 
in order to assess the mine 'On the ba::;is of that part of 
the total net proceeds from the property allocated to 
Utah. But depletion is a reduction in values by destroy-
ing or consuming resources or values. Just as this ad 
valorem property tax deals with total value, so, of neces-
sity, must depletion he computed on total value. For 
purposes of depletion the taxpayer must have the value 
of his property as of the basie date, tax free. And, of 
course, it can make not the slightest difference in fact 
or principle where state lines shall cross the mining proc-
esses. No more did the Legislature when enacting the 
State Franchise Tax Statute intend by the term "net 
income from the property" only that par't of the net 
income from the property which the Commission ''in its 
discretion" shall have allocated to Utah. 
Section 80-5-66 of the .Mine Occupation Tax Statute 
provides that the miner- shall pay an occupation tax 
equal to one per cent of the gross amount received for 
metalliferous ores sold. And it is further provided that 
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if a mill or other reduction works shall be operated ex-
elusively in connection with a mine, such mill or reduc-
tion works shall be treated as a part of the mine and the 
cost of uperating such mill or reduction works shall be re-
garded as part of the cost of mining, and in addition 
the cost of assaying, sampling, smelting, refining, and 
transportation shall be deducted. Again it makes not 
a particle of difference where state lines cross the min-
ing processes. 
Does the Conrt appreciate the fact that a "refinery" 
-fire or elcctrolyt ic-is to copper the same type of a 
"reduction works" that for example a cyanide plant is to 
gold? Each is eqnally necessary to create or effect the 
first normally eommercinJ marketable product. 
True, by allocating income from the sales of gold to 
the mint on some ratio of costs, or by the injection of a 
basically unrelated "state 1ine" theory, one could declare 
by fiat that X Dollars was the value of the ore before 
the eyanide or any other intermediate process in ,the 
mining production chain short of the ultimate produet. 
But that deelaration ipsa dixit cannot create something 
that in fact does not exist; nor could the Legislature 
have had such in mind when it enacted these statutes. 
'rhe income from each mine expressed in dollars is still 
the value or sales price received for the mine's first 
normally commercial marketable product in fact, not in 
theory. 
It is submitted, with all respect due this Court, that 
the portion of its opinion here discussed is inconsistent 
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with itself and unintelligi,ble; that it is constructed upon 
assump6ons contrary to fact and in the teeth of the 
stipulruted record herein; that the Court has ignored, 
cir by implica:tion has rewritten the statute, not construed 
it; and in so doing has tendered into an already com-
plicated problem an incoherent discussion which bears 
no logical relation to the conclusion announced. 
II. 
Point 
This Court has violated basic and elementary principles 
of statutory construction by concluding that depletion may 
be computed only on that part of Kennecott's net income 
from the property assigned to Utah. 
a. A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that 
where legislation is adpoted from another jurisdiction, 
the interpretations and meaning which have been given 
that wording by the sister jurisdiction are likewise 
adopted as a part of the statute. 
This rule has been generally followed in this state: 
In re Oowan, 98 U. 393, 99 P. 2d 605; Norville v. State 
Tax Commission, 98 U. 170, 97 P. 2d 937, 126 A.L.R. 
1318; Fuller-Toponce Trud-e Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission~, 99 U. 28, 96 P. 2d 722; and In re Ra1eigh, 48 U. 
128, 158 P. 705 wherein the rule is stated thus: 
''In view ~that the decisions of Iowa were in 
effect before that section was adopted by the code 
commission of this state in 1898, we must assume 
that the construchon placed upon ~t by the Su-
preme Court of Iowa was likewise adopted.'' 
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By the record herein it was stipulated (R. 106) that 
the Federal law was the model for the Utah income tax 
law; and th~~!h re_~ to the base for the pere~p~~ 
depletion deduction, the language is identic~l. In each 
__.::;.----~----- -- ----
case that base is '' ine_ome from the property.:' This has 
been construed to mean in the ease of this same and simi-
lar mining operations, the income obtained through the 
norma:! milling and reduction processes necessary in 
addition to extraction to obtain the commercially market-
able product of refined copper. (R. 67) 
Since this does not appear to have been made too 
clear to the Court, we quote from the undisputed ,testi-
mony of expert witness <H~ORGE C. EARL (R. 67-9): 
'' Q Has the Federal Government ever attempted 
in its administration of its law to makE} such 
an allocation as the Commission's Staff now 
'proposes? 
"A Insofar as the operations of Kennecott in 
Utah, or the Utah Copper before it became 
Kennecott's property was eoncerned, n10 
s11ch allocation has ever been attempted. They 
have, however, in recent years a1ttempted to 
allocate profits from certain oper'ations 'Of 
some of the other units of Kennecott, where 
these further processes were carried on by 
Kennecott. It has never attempted to allocate 
any profits to any of the properties of Ken-
necott where the processes or transportation 
has been hy others. It has announced no 
intention of ever doing such a thing. We have 
had some controversy with them as to the 
allocati'On of profits to smelting wt Nevada 
and in New Mexico where the Internal Reve-
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nue Department has attempted to allocate 
a part of,-a very small part I may say-
of the profit to the smelting of the concen-
trates in Kennecott's srm~lters. The basis 
for this attempt by the Government as an-
nounced by them is because Kennecott, at 
'those particular smelters, smelts other 
people's ores, that is they engaged in a cus-
tom smelting business, and do, of course, 
make a profit on that smelting, or attempt 
to make a profit at least on the smelting of 
the custom ores, and because of that the Fed-
eral Government has attempted to allocate 
a very small portion of the profit to the 
smelting in those two instances. 
"Q But as I gather, not in the cases of the Utah 
operations because it is the company's con-
tention that whatever profit there results 
from this postmilling operations is paid to 
the parties who do that world 
"A Of course, that is the basis underlying it, hut 
the Federal Government had never attempted 
to allocate anything. They say 'On their de,ter-
mina:tions, 'These services performed by 
others at cost to Kennecott' and they have 
made no attempt whatever to allocate any 
profit. I might state in connection with this 
that things that have developed in that con-
nection, that much of this need of allocating 
profits so far as the T~~ederal Government 
is eon(~erned, has arisen from the fact that in 
man~· instances, in fact several cases in Utah, 
it is done where a Mining Company charged 
itself a cost of smelting, or made a cost for 
smelting whi(·h wasn't the eost, for instance, 
if one of HH~ smelting eompanies in Utah 
would smelt a certain grade of ore for an-
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other mining company for $7.00 a ton without 
charging themselves $7.00 a ton, and as a re-
sult the smelting operation was making rthe 
profit at the expense of the mining O'P'era-
ti on. And it was announced in many in-
stances, and it appears in the Congressional 
Record in statements made by the under-
~(~eretn rics of the 'rreusury, particularly },! r. 
Paul, that the purpose of ailoca ting any costs 
whatsoever to processes was to make the com-
pany owning a smelter, or other processing 
plant,-put them on the same basis as any 
other taxpayer ·who didn't own those things, 
and that the Department didn't ever intend to 
allocate profits on any other conditions. 
"Q T11en, Mr. Earl, it is your opinion that by the 
same reason there is no occasion whatsoever 
for fhis attempt hy the Commission's Staff to 
moJ.:e an allocation in this instance~ 
''A That is correct.'' 
So it would hardly seem reasonable that Utah's 
legislature had any different concerpt in mind when it 
provided that depletion might be a percentage of the 
same net income from the same mine. That is, the same 
refined copper less the same expenses; as likewise was 
the base under the occupation and net proceeds ~taxes, 
supra. 
VVe submit that to hold to the contrary would be in 
violation 'Of this fundamental and elementary rule ·of 
statutory construction. 
b. 'l'he seeond basic rule of statutory construction 
which the present opinion violates is that of administra-
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tive or contemporaneous construction. It was here stipu-
lated that from 19:n when the law was first enacted until 
1942, ~the 'Cax Oommission in applying the statute to this 
and ail other taxpayers construed the intent of Utah's 
legislature to he that adopted hy the E'ederal Govern-
ment (which the Commission likewise invoked for both 
the occupation and net proceeds mining tax laws). That 
is, taxpayer's refined copper as the first commercially 
marketable product was taken a.s the tax base, from 
which was then deducted the expenses of the necessary 
and normal extraction, treatment and reduction proces-
ses and the deduction for depletion. The proceeds from 
the sales of the copper before any fabrication constituted 
the "income from the property." (R. 106-8). 
Each of the elements appropriate to place this rule 
of administrative construction into operation is in this 
instance present. \:Ve quote from 2 Sutherland on Statu-
tory Construc1tion ( 3rd :B~d.) Sec. 5104: 
'' rrhe conclusiveness of a contemporaneous 
and practical construction will depend upon a 
number of additional elements that give efficacy 
to the rule. In general, these elements are: (1) 
that the interpretation originated from a reliable 
source; (2) that the interpretation has continued 
for a long period of time and received wide ac-
ceptance; and (3) that the interpreta,tion was 
made at or n~ar the time of the enactment of the 
statute.'' 
In this respect the situation is far different from 
the deduction-of-income-taxes interpretation orginaily 
a par't of this case, and determined by this Court in the 
New Park Mining Company decision, 196 P. 2d 485. 
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Thus the opmwn as it now stands is in the teeth 
of this basic rule, to a degree ,that amounts to a viola-
tion of the elementary principle that it is not the province 
of the Cour't to legislate. 
III. 
Point 
The Court erred in its decision relative to the depletion 
deduction wherein it held that Kennecott's request to c>hange 
the method of computation was "unduly delay,ed," a hold-
ing contrary to fact and not raised by the Commission. 
True, Kennecott once had "its option to select the 
mPt'}wd it desir''d til use" ( CI!inion p. (j). The Court tfJen 
admits that ''a change in the administrative regulations 
might be good grounds for requesting a change in ac-
counting practice." There is no dispute that important 
administrative changes here were made. 
a. But how, in this case, was KennecoH's request 
"unduly delayed"'? It was made before and during the 
only formal hearing hefore the Commission, which made 
the record for this Court. 
The Commission did not object that the request was 
not timely. It stipulated in this Court by the time of oral 
argument that Kennecott would he permitted to switch 
to the cost-or-value method. Then it joined in our request 
for an interpretation of the question of whether or not 
it might invoke the federal percentage or some other 
alternative method instead of the two specifically de-
scribed in the law. 
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This Court was the first to suggest any "undue" 
delay. vVhat standard is now to guide Kennecott, or any 
other taxpayer? Does the Court really mean that we 
can't request a change of m'ethod, because we didn't 
anticipate that the Commission would make at least three 
changes in administmtive regulations; and so anticipat-
ing file our request in this case two years before that 
fact occurred 'I Of course no taxpayer cnn sustain that 
burden of prophecy if that he the test of a timely re-
CfLWst. 
vVe can add but little to the dissent: "The rejection 
by the Commission of its previous stand in the matter 
should throw the door open to the company making a 
selection as contemplated by the section of the code in-
volved.'' 
We have thought it fundamental that one who 
changes the rules of any game in the course of its con-
duct without allowing the others to ad.fust their positions 
a,ccord,inJgly, might be characterized by an unpleasant 
word. Th'e Commission realizing this by the time of the 
hearing before this Court and when the record in this 
Oourt had been au,gmented to show its repndiation of for-
mer :principles, cooperated fully by asking for an in-
terpretation by this Court of the methods or courses 
of action open, including a switch to cost depleti'on which 
it professed to this Oourt would be allowed. 
Yet the majority opinion seems to hold Kennecott to 
the position taken by it in reliance on the Commission's 
previous actions; and uses as an excuse something never 
raised by 'the Commission-that Kennecott's requests 
in both instances were ''unduly delayed.'' 
2f 
IV. 
Point. 
The Court erred in holding that Kennecott's request 
for permission to change the method of depletion computa-
tion was for no "substantial" reason, but merely to "escape 
tax liability". 
Kennecott's reasons for requesting the change in 
method for computing depletion are in no way asso-
ciated with ''repeated requests to change systems merely 
for the purpose of escaping tax liability". (Opinion p. 
7.) It was the only such request since the law was first 
enacted in 19;!1. 
Kennecott felt and still feels ~that it is being denied 
the "reasonable allowance for depletion" which Utah's 
statute grants to all taxpayers alike. We quote from 
Section 80-1:3-8 ( 8) which establishes as a deduction: 
'' • • • a reasonable allowance for depletion 
and for depreciation of improvements, according 
to the peculiar conditions in each case." 
We submit that the denial of such aUowanee by 
commission or court is indeed a "substantial" cause 
of complaint, even ~though the incidental result is a 
lower tax and to that extent an ''escape of tax liability''. 
Since the Oourt has either overlooked, or by ignor-
ing has not found persuasive the basis for Kennecott's 
claim 'that it has been denied that ''reasonable allow-
ance", these reasons are reiterated briefly as follows: 
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a. Utah's corporation franchise tax is a tax on net 
income. It is not a tax on returns of capital. 
b. Therefore not only are applicable expenses first 
deducted to obtain the taxable net income base, but also 
depreciation and mine depletion. Depletion is peculiar 
to wasting assets involving returns of capital. 
c. To determine mine depletion, a choice between 
two general methods is originally available to the ~tax­
payer: 
( 1) Straight-line depletion of the cost-or-value of 
the pro'perty at the time the tax law became effective 
-just as in the case of depreciation. 
(2) A percentage of either the "gross" under 
federal law, or "net" under the Utah law, "income from 
the property". 
d. The taxpayer Is afforded an initial election 
between these methods. Thereafter a switch may not he 
made without the consent of the Tax Commission. This 
is not an arbitrary power ves'ted in the Commission, 
hut a control to be used according to the circumstances 
of each particular case to prev·ent unfair results to either 
the State or the taxpayer. 
e. Since 1916 the Federal Government, and from 
1931 until this case, the Tax Commission alike, con-
strued "income from the property" to be the value of 
the first commercially marketable product obtained from 
the mine. In the case of porphyry copper mines such as 
the Utah Copper Mine with its extreme'ly low ore con-
30 
tent, this first commercially marketable product is re-
fined copper. Some of the smelting, and the equally 
essential refining processes ha:ve taken place outside of 
the State of Utah. No fabrication is here involved, we 
again repeat. 
f. Utah's Tax Commission from 1931 through 1941 
also construed the ne~t income from Kennecott's property 
on which depletion was computed to be net income before 
deduction of federal taxes. 
_q. Helying upon interpretations e and f above, the 
owner of the Utah Copper .Mine in 1931 originally elected 
the rwrcentage depletion method. In 1936, when the 
property was acquired by Kennecott, the taxpayer by 
agTeement with the Commission filed its tax returns 
invoking a method of separate accounting for the Utah 
Copper l\fine, likewise in reliance upon the administra-
tive interpretations outlined above. 
h. In 1945 (although for the 1942 tax return) 1the 
Tax Commission made several changes in its rulings 
including two chang·es specifically with respect to points 
e and f: 
(1) It determined that "income from th'e property" 
now was meant by the legislature to mean either the 
:value of the ore at the mine, or at most the :value 'Of the 
conc'entrates at the mill. Since there was no commercial 
market for either, it invented a self-proving formula 
applied to Kennecott alone to establish or create such 
a :value mathematically. 
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(2) Also it said that mines using the percentage 
depletion method now must first deduct the federal,taxes. 
These taxes often reached the 90% bracket since the 
United States was financing World War II. 
J,. Kennecott pointed out (Exhibit 4) that the 
mathematical result was to cut down to less than one-
hnlf, the depletion allowance which would be available 
under either of the two federal methods; or under the 
Utah co::-;t-or-value of 1931 method; or under the Uta:h 
'percent-age method nntil the injection of the distorted 
frrlernl taxes and the ehanp;cs in administrative rulings. 
It shonU again he recalled that the taxpayer nndcr its 
10;l1 ehnice had elected to use the per,centage rather 
than the cost-or-value method in reliance upon the Tax 
Commission's interpreta1tions which now were to be 
changed. 
j. By timely request-before and at the hearing 
which was sought to be reviewed in this Court-Ken-
necott accordingly asked: 
(l) To be allowed to "re-elect" 'the method for 
determining depletion; i.·e., to use either the Utah cost-
or-value method, or th'e federal percentage-of-gross 
method. 
(2) To file a return on 1the basis of its over-all 
operations. (We need not set forth here the treatment 
afforded this second request, since it is hereinafter 
covered as the final reason urged for granting a rehear-
ing of this cause.) 
k. As 'to changing the method of computing the 
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depletion deduction, the Tax Commission by its brief 
and stipulation herein finally conceded the point. It said 
that the taxpayer would be granted permission to switch 
to the cost-or-value method. It also cooperated by joining 
Kennecott in asking the Court to determine whether or 
not the federal percentage-of-gross method was avail-
able under the wording and intent of Utah's statutes. 
l. As to the latter, this Court said in effect "Per-
haps-we need not decide". And as to the former, af'ter 
fifteen months it hranded Kennecott's request--finally 
concc(!ul b:i lhe Commission-as untimely! 
Jl!. Next the Conrt proceeded to rejeot the federal 
interr!retation as to what vVaR "income from the proper-
tY'' hecause '' ariRing under different statutory pro-
visions". But the wording is identical; it is stipulated 
that it was the model for Utah's law; and therefore by 
a basic rule of statutory construction the feder:al inter-
pretations at the time Utah's legislature adopted th'e 
wording were to be followed. 
n. No mention was made by the Court of the 'Pax 
Commission's own similar administrative interpretations 
of this wording for eleven years until this case. 
o. And finally, the Court rewrote the statute to 
say in effect that percentage depletion under Section 
80-1B-8 should be based not only upon net income "from 
the property", but should be further limited to net in-
come ''from the property assignable to Utah under 
Section 80-13-21". 
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Thus apparently the majority concluded that here 
the depletion allowance was reasonable. Therefore of 
course it would follow that the Commission could not 
he arbitrary in denying use of any other method of 
computation. 
nut in order 80 to hold the allowance reasonable, 
the Court had first to lay down a new set of rules to 
determine depletion for a mine with multi,ple state pro-
cesses neressary before the first commercially market-
able mineral product is obtained. The fallacy of this 
diseriminatory ruling has heretofore been made appar-
ent. 'I'his Court erred in not requiring the allowance of 
the reasonable deduction in accordance with the mandate 
of Utah's legislature. 
v. 
Point. 
The Court erred in holding that the record in this case 
supported the Tax Commission's decision, rejecting Een-
necott's corporate tax return and inst~ad requiring con-
tinued use of its Utah Copp,er Division operations as the 
basis for tax computation. 
The majority opinion assumes facts and possibilities 
for which no basis exists in the record before the court. 
For example is the next-to-last sentence of the 
opinion on page 3-"Had the request been granted at 
that late date it would have resulted in a substantial 
c:hange in accounting procedure and would have com-
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plicated and not simplified what was already a difficult 
tax question". Again, in the next-to-last paragraph on 
page 4: "We • • • see many pradical difficulties had a 
different method been permitted. • • * To use the method 
set out in the first subparagraphs of the section might 
introduce variable facts, some impossible of ascertain-
ment, Rnch as the relative value of mines or mining 
property. The determination of this factor alone might 
lead to endless and unsatisfactory litigation. In addi-
tion it might unjustly discriminate against this state 
or the taxpayer in that the tax assessed might bear no 
n~m;ondJle relationship to the value of the ore extracted 
or the mnount of business done in this state." (Italics 
ours.) 
\V e thought this was a judicial proceeding in the 
nature of a review of the record below-not an occasion 
for the expression of what "may" or "might" or might 
not be. And we thought Utah statutes as interpreted 
hy the Califomia Paeking Company (97 u. i3G7, ~~3 P. 2d 
46:)) ea:-:e were (•lear and unamhiguons, the decision to 
depend UJ!On the record in the particular case. 
Here the record is silent, except that in January, 
1948 (long before the hearing before the Commission 
and its decision in 1949 on which this review is based) 
Kennecott prepared and filed an amended return on the 
corpora:te basis as requirecl by stat,nte. It stated that the 
reason for the change was the Commission's repudiation 
of principles which originally caused the taxpayer to use 
the separate accounting method of return with the 
consent of the Commission. (R. 228-234.) The Com-
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mission itself didn't find anything wrong with this 
amenderl return-even as to the "rlifficulties" which 
the majority opinion thinks "might" be there. It simply 
ignored the amended return to the extent that it was 
omitted from the record certified by it to this Court, 
until Kennecott filed a motion to augment. Then at lasrt 
it sent the amended return to this Court. 
·what guide is now to be followed in such cases by 
Kennecntt or any other taxpayed Is the Commission's 
{lX parte fiat that the formula does not work in a par-
ticular case absolute, a hearing and record being unnec-
essary~ It is possible that given a hearing, and if it 
were incumbent upon it so to do, Kennecott could dem-
onstrate that t'he corporate method the better effected 
an allocation of earnings; and rthe Commission might so 
hold. \Ve had thought it clear under the California Pack-
ing case (97 U. 367, 93 P. 2d 463) that there must be a 
hearing with the burden of proof on the Commission. 
As a matter of fact, H1e suggestion for an amended 
return filed on the corporate basis originally came in 
mirl-Hl47 from the Commission's own staff. (R. 0:1-6.) 
At that time the Staff took fue posi~tion that under Utah's 
statutes, an interstate taxpayer had to file on the cor-
porate hasis, unless by agTeement or by assuming its 
burden of proof under subsection 8, the Commission 
otherwise determined. We agree thart this still plainly 
states the law. But presumably when it was discovered 
that the resulting tax computations were in Kennecott's 
favor, the Staff forthwith abandoned all such talk and 
proceeded simply to ignore Kennecott's amended return 
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prepared on that basis. One wonders, had the Staff 
persisted because fhe tax results were in the State's 
favor, if such action on review would be held by this 
court to be "untimely"; and void because of a major 
change in accounting; and in the absence of any record, 
fraught with possible "difficulties". 
And as to these "difficulties" which the Court 
anticipates here, we cannot forget :Mr. Christopherson's 
statrment in the Staff conferences to the effect that 
"there would be no great administrative difficulties" 
should filing· on t11e corporate basis be required. Any 
taxpayer with corporate property within and without 
the state, or with employees within or without the state, 
mn~d . .;ustaiJJ i :~; n:~tnms, nnd lliffieulties "mny" be 
<'neountered by it or the State Tax Commission. 
Thus Kennecott wHh no great difficulty prepared 
aml filed its amended return .January 19, 1948. The 
formal hearing was held in December of that year. It 
is this amended return flled more than a year before 
the Commission's decision .J annary 22, 1949 which, if 
the majority opinion stands, was now "untimely". 
To conclude on this point, frankly we are shocked 
that members of this Court, with no definitive deter-
mination by the Commission, without a record on which 
its decision should be based, and without an opportunity 
to the taxpayer to be heard, should deny the opportunity 
to proceed in accordance with what is the plain mandate 
of the legislature. The taxpayer rmtst file, invoking the 
formula of Section 80-13-21, until the Commission should 
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determine following a hearing that a return on the cor-
porate basis "does not" make a proper assignm~nt of 
income to the State of Utah. And the Commission's 
determination must find appropriate support in the 
record upon review. 
Conclusion. 
Following oral argument herein where substantially 
the same time was given this "difficult" case as in 
actions involving a simple appeal, the then Chairman 
of 11H~ T:1x Commission shared the opinion of plaintiffs' 
counsel-that this court simply didn't understand the 
ramitlcations l1erein involved. Recognizing fully our own 
shortcomings responsible for this situation, we tried in 
vain to suggest re-argument when a year elapsed with-
out action by the Court. Now the opinion finally pro-
dueed confirms our worst fears. 
\Ve ·would think that the Commission itself would 
ask for further clarification. 'l'his, since the mixing 
together of the depletion allowance with assignment of 
income to state lines not only is contrary to the Com-
mission's interpretations through 1941, including its 
settlement of Case No. 6324 herein, but is about to 
plunge us into further confusion and conflict. For if 
by mathematical say-so something not a fact is held to 
be so for depletion purposes, namely, a commercial 
market value for Kennecott's mill eoncentrates, it be-
eomes such for occupation and net proceeds tax pur-
poses; and the arbitrary state line cut-off rather than 
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the first commercially marketable product in fact-cop-
per at the refineries-will be the tax base ·with Ken-
necott entitled to substantial refunds due to these changes 
in rn]ings. That is, unless this court will also rewrite 
the occupation and net proceeds tax laws. 
Kennecott respectfully requests that to prevent in-
justice and further conflict and confusion, this Court 
should grant a rehearing. It should take the time nec-
essary to become truly informed on the issues herein so 
that it may remand the case with the following instruc-
tions: 
a. r~'hat the Utah legislature, using the words "in-
come from the property" concerning the mine depletion 
deduction, intPnrled to require use of the market price 
or value of the mine operator's first normally com-
mercial marketable products. (Just as Congress in-
tended, the Utah legislatnre intended with respect to 
the mine occupation and net proceeds taxes, and as 
the '!'ax Commission interpreted the law for eleven 
years.) 
b. That in v1ew of the Tax Commission's change 
of administrative rulings, this taxpayer should he af-
forded the opportunity to re-file, selecting anew from 
the alternatives originally available. That this amended 
return be subject to determination by the Tax Commis-
sion to the extent necessary to invoke the legislative 
mandates that the depletion allowance he "fair and 
reasonable" under the circumstances of this case, and 
that the assignment of mcome fairly reflects to Utah 
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''the 'portion of net income rea.sona;bly attributable to 
business done in this state''; both such determinations 
to be subject to the usual procedures for redetermination 
and review. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. C. PARSONS, 
WM. M. McCREA, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
40 
